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STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. MILITARY CONQUEST

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The present government of the Communist regime in Central-South China is a continuation of the Chung-yüan, or Central China Provisional Government, which was established by the Communists in December 1948. The Communists look upon this region, which consists of the six provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, as the birthplace of Chinese Communism, for within its borders, Mao Tse-tung, Li Hsien-nien, and Fang Fang, among others, began their revolutionary activities.

Although Communist revolutionary leaders failed to keep these provinces as strongholds before World War II, two years after the war, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Liu Po-ch'eng emerged from hiding and became active in an area extending from the Yellow River in the north to the Yangtze Valley in the south, and west from the Han River to the Tientsin-- P'u-k'ou (Pukow) railroad in the east.

At the end of 1948, when the battle of Huai Hai was in progress, the Communist Field Army, under Ch'en-I, was joined by the Communist Second Field Army, under Liu Po-ch'eng, which had been fighting in the vicinity of Ta-pieh Shan Range in North China, and the Communist Fourth Field Army, under Lin Piao, which had been active in northeast China (Manchuria). One and a half years after the fall of Canton and Hainan Island, the conquest of Central-South China was complete.

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As the army of Lin Piao entered the battle from the northeast along the Peking-Canton railroad, the jurisdiction of the Chung-yüan Provisional Government

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was extended to give the Communists control over other provincial governments. The Military and Political Committee, which had jurisdiction over the six provinces of Central-South China, was established in February 1950. These provinces, with the exception of a part of Honan and Hupeh, came under the domination of the Communists after the crossing of the Yangtze River in 1949. The Communist conquest of the southern provinces was successful because of the factors described in a report made by Teng Tzu-hui, vice-chairman of the Military and Political Committee, in February 1950:

"For the purpose of annihilation of the enemy army and liberation of the people, we depended mainly upon the heroic efforts of the People's Liberation Army. The logistic support, or Aid-to-the-War-Front Drive, also fulfilled a mission of great importance. This was a complicated and heavy responsibility. During the months of March and April of last year, we had to give supplies to the Second Field Army of 400,000 men who passed through Honan and Hupeh to cross the Yangtze Valley. In May and June of the same year, we had to supply the Fourth Field Army of 1,000,000 men who marched through the provinces. In the months of September and October we were called upon for the third time to supply the 600,000 men of the Second Field Army for an expedition to the Southwest Region, and it also became necessary to send reinforcements for these armies which fought side by side in the south and west of China. Our rallying cry was 'All for the support of the war-front; all for the battlefield; all for the victory!' [1]

1. Teng Tzu-hui, "Ch'ien Chung-yüan Lin-shih Cheng-fu Chin I-nien-lai Ti Shih-cheng Pao-kao" [Report on the Administration of the Former Chung-yuan Provisional Government during the Past Year, "], Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook] , Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao she, 1950, p. 263.

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The main task of the Aid-to-the-War-Front Drive was to assure the supply of food and other necessities and to carry wounded troops to areas of safety. In districts where revolutionary governments were already in existence, supply stations were readily formed at important points. In areas where there was no revolutionary government, the armies depended on the detachment of civilian workers who followed the armies and also on the temporarily formed peace-preservation corps for collection of food and forage, and for transportation arrangements. The following is an incomplete list of the amounts of supplies to the Communist field armies in this region.

Supplies for Communist Field Armies (Nov. 1949)*

Supplies#	Amount Supplied
Food.....	480,241,293 catties (528,265,422 lbs.)
Firewood	322,788,208 catties (355,067,029 lbs.)
Grass for horses....	118,193,268 catties (130,012,595 lbs.)
Other fodder..	75,469,000 catties (83,015,900 lbs.)

*/ Teng Tzu-hui, "Ch'ien Chung-yüan Lin-shih Cheng-fu Chin-i-nien-lai Ti Shih-cheng Pao-kao" [Report on the Administration of the Former Chung-yüan Provisional Government during the Past Year"], Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, Ch'ang chiang jih-pao she, 1950, p. 625.

#/ Supplies from the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi are not included.

In addition, the Chung-yuan Provisional Government organized laborers, who gave the equivalent of 30,329,080 work-days to aid the Communist field armies on the march. The workers repaired 2,188 kilometers

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(1, 367. 5 miles) of railroad lines, 145 bridges, 12, 516 kilometers (7, 822. 5 miles) of highways, and 1, 293 highway bridges, according to the Communist report.[2]

Teng Tzu-hui explained the difficulty of the task. "Except for Honan and part of Hupeh which belonged to the old liberation area, the other four provinces, excluding Hainan Island, were liberated within six months so the responsibility of taking-over was a heavy one."[3]

The Communists first seized power in the urban districts, which contained the largest number of persons sympathetic to Communism, and then extended their influence to the rural districts. A great number of cadres of the Communist Party including 10, 000 from North China, 8, 000 from Northeast China, and 5, 000 from Central China, were drafted and sent to this region to assist. Underground workers were also employed in Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi. In each province a "revolutionary university" was established to train educated men and women for the service of the Party. Approximately 200 to 300 men and women were enlisted in each country, and altogether a total of 200, 000 inhabitants of Central-South China were trained for Party work. All existing governmental institutions were kept as they were, but employed personnel had to undergo the process of re-education in Communist doctrine. The old personnel under the pao-chia system (an organization established on the local level for the promotion of public safety) was left intact in order to avoid disturbances and to maintain a system of village defense. Shortly thereafter, the Communists organized peasants' associations, trade unions, and women's federations, thus encompassing all groups.[4]

2. Ibid., p. 625.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 626.

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The total trade volume of these fairs during 1952 was reported to have been 5,430 billion yuan, which would represent, if accurate, an increase of 141.5 per cent over that of 1952. In terms of ownership of the trading concerns, the state sector contributed 61.21 per cent; co-operatives, 8.97 per cent; joint public and private operation, 1.17 per cent; and the private concerns, 28.65 per cent.[88]

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To sum up, the commodity movement between South and North China is mainly by way of railways and partly by coastal shipping, but between Central-South and East China inland waterways and railways are the principal means of transportation. Transportation facilities betwen the Central-South and the Southwest of China are inadequate because projected railway lines have not been completed. Highway and air transportation as a whole play only a minor role in Central-South China's trade. The two nearly built railways to the border of Indo-China are for military rather than for economic use.

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The purpose of building the Lai-pin--Mu-nan-kuan Railway was purely military. The Chinese Communists, in order to facilitate their southern expedition and expand their military strength in Southeast Asia, had to extend substantial aids to Ho Chih-minh, chairman of the Vietminh government in Indo-China. The completion of this railway in December 1951 had a direct bearing upon Ho's military success in 1954. Military supplies, including men, weapons, and approximately 500,000 tons[89] of grain were shipped during the three-year period, 1952-54, of the war in Indo-China.

88. Ibid., p. 8.

89. Ta-lu Liang-Huang Ti P'ou-hsi [An Analysis of Grain Shortage in Mainland China], The Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, Taipei, June.14, 1954, p. 13.

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Furthermore, if war should begin in Southeast Asia, military supplies of Russian origin could be shipped to Mu-nan-kuan directly by train and then trans-shipped to Vietminh. The Lai-pin--Mu-nan-kuan Railway can be considered as a most strategic line which would not only enable Communist China to render direct aid to Vietminh, but would also facilitate Soviet control over the whole of Southeast Asia.

The newly built Li-t'ang--Chan-chiang Railway has a similar strategic value. Chan-chiang (Kwangchowan), the southernmost terminal of the railway, is an important harbor opposite the Lei-chou Peninsula. Harbor-improvement work is underway and is expected to be completed by the end of 1955. The motive of building this new railway, and the reason for the construction of a new harbor in Chan-chiang, becomes evident when the following facts are considered: in order to avoid difficulties similar to those caused by the blockade of Formosa, strategic materials from Communist satellite countries can be imported through the port of Chan-chiang. This railway serves as a short-cut from Kwangtung to Kwangsi and reaches the Leu-chou Peninsula, gateway to Hainan Island. An important military base in the event of a Formosan invasion, the peninsula is reported to be guarded by 50,000 troops and equipped with six newly constructed air fields. In short, the Li-t'ang--Chan-chiang Railway will not only facilitate importation of strategic materials, but will also provide conditions favorable to the consolidation of military strength against Formosa and other parts of Southeast Asia.